The Battle of the St. Lawrence by Nathan M. Greenfield

Author:Nathan M. Greenfield [Greenfield, Nathan M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-1-4434-0149-4
Publisher: HarperCollins Canada
Published: 2004-12-26T16:00:00+00:00

More revealing of both the emotions of the moment (which included the Admiralty’s growing unease at the state of the RCN’s training) and the “fog of war”—and, as Geoffrey Smith suggests, the Admiralty’s attempt to pass off one of its own failures to the RCN—is the “Analysis of Attacks by U-Boat on Convoy SQ-36 on 15th and 16th Sept. 1942.” The part of the Remarks section that deals with the attack on the fifteenth minces few words: “The absence of any escort organization is clearly shown in this attack. ‘Salisbury’ left Sydney after the remaining escorts had sailed and was therefore not able to hold an escort conference. On joining the convoy at 2045/13 [and becoming the chief escort ship] ‘Salisbury’ was informed by ‘Arrowhead’ that, in his opinion, previous sinkings in the River were caused by mines and not torpedoes. However there would still appear to be no apparent reason to account for the absence of escort organization, especially as there was ample time in which to signal instructions.”

“Captain Skinner could not have told Salisbury that ‘in his opinion, previous sinkings in the River were caused by mines and not torpedoes,’” says Smith. “Even when we were told by the captain of the Aeas [on September 6] that he thought he’d struck a mine, Skinner ordered HMCS Raccoon to screen us as we picked up the Aeas’s survivors; you only screen if you think torpedoes are a possibility. A day later, when the SS Oakton and two other ships were sunk, Skinner knew that they were torpedoed because I reported to him that I had seen the torpedoes pass twelve yards behind our stern. He knew damn well on the fifteenth that those sinkings and Charlottetown’s were caused by torpedoes. It’s hard not to think that the report isn’t slanted towards her [Salisbury].”

Whether the report was purposely slanted is an open question. What isn’t in doubt, however, is that it was written before HMCS Vegreville and Chedabucto and one Fairmile had filed their action reports, none of which provide support for the report’s assertion that Skinner believed that the previous sinkings were caused by mines.

Smith’s view of the report is mirrored by Perkin’s, who believes that one claim—“After realizing that a ship had been torpedoed, ‘Salisbury’ failed to order ‘Artichoke’ or pass any instructions to the escort, and did not herself take any action until 12 minutes after the torpedoing, and 5 minutes after having sighted a periscope in the centre of the convoy. The periscope was under observation by ‘Salisbury’ for 7 minutes”—amounts to a calumny of his captain. “As soon as we saw the ship explode,” says Perkin, “we were at Action Stations. It was only a matter of a few moments before the captain ordered a hard turn to take us around toward the position the U-boat had to have been in when it fired.” Arrowhead’s logbook and, ironically, the report’s own summation of Arrowhead‘s actions disprove the report’s claim that Salisbury “failed to pass any instructions to the escort.

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